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A Colorado statue establishes a 100-foot zone around the entrance to any "health care facility." Within this buffer zone, people may not, without consent "knowingly approach another person within 8 feet," for the purpose of passing out literature or engaging in "oral protest, education, or counseling" on a public sidewalk. The question is whether the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the speaker are abridged by the protection the statute provides for the unwilling listener.

Whether a public university can deny funds to a religious student group that it provides to nonreligious student groups.

Whether an injunction that limits the places where and the manner in which antiabortion protestors may demonstrate violates the First Amendment.

Whether a governmental entity may constitutionally prohibit the distribution of literature and the solicitation of contributions in airport terminals.

Whether a state may constitutionally prohibit the solicitation of votes and the display or distribution of campaign materials within 100 feet of the entrance to a polling place.

Is a sidewalk on post office property, which is intended only to facilitate traffic to and from the post office, a public forum? Does a government ban on solicitation emanating from such a sidewalk violate the First Amendment rights of respondents?

Whether a Brookfield, Wisconsin ordinance making it "unlawful for any person to engage in picketing before or about the residence or dwelling of any individual," and declaring that the primary purpose of the ban is to "protect[t] and preserve[e] the home" violates freedom of speech and expression under the First Amendment.

Whether a resolution banning all "First Amendment activities" at Los Angeles International Airport violates the First Amendment

Whether federal exclusion of legal defense and political advocacy organizations from participation in a charity drive aimed at federal employees violates the First Amendment

Whether a federal statutewhich bans picketing and the distribution of leaflets on the public sidewalks surrounding the Supreme Courtviolates the 1st Amendment.

Whether a public university’s interest in maintaining a "strict separation of church and state" allows it to bar religious student groups from reserving facilities for worship.

Whether a 1934 federal statutewhich imposes a $300 fine on anyone who willfully deposits mailable matter in a letterbox without proper postageviolates the 1st Amendment free speech rights of organizations and individuals who spread their messages by putting pamphlets and other materials in private mailboxes.

Whether a state, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, may confine religious organizations wishing to sell and distribute religious literature at a state fair to an assigned location within the fairgrounds.

Whether the 1st and 14th Amendments protect the right of individuals to solicit signatures for political petitions in privately owned shopping centers.

Whether a city ordinancewhich bars door-to-door solicitation by charities that cannot prove that 75% of their proceeds go directly to charitable purposesviolates the 1st and 14th Amendment free speech rights of solicitors.

Whether a public employee forfeits his or her 1st Amendment protection against governmental abridgment of freedom of speech when he arranges to communicate privately with his employer rather than to express his views publicly.

Whether the Bar, acting with state authorization, constitutionally may discipline a lawyer for soliciting clients in person, for pecuniary gain, under circumstances likely to pose dangers that the State has a right to prevent.

Whether a government ban on political rallies on military bases violates the 1st Amendment.

Whether striking union members have a First Amendment free speech right to picket inside a shopping center in order to advertise their strike against the owner of one of the stores.

Whether a Florida ordinance making it a public nuisance and a punishable offense for a drive-in movie theater to exhibit films containing nudity, when the screen is visible from a public street or place, violates the First Amendment guarantee to freedom of speech and expression.

Whether a state may punish speech that is not part of “narrowly limited classes of speech” outside First Amendment protection (such as incitement, obscenity, or fighting words), and whether advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future period qualifies as incitement.

Whether the city’s “anti-picketing” ordinance and “anti-noise” ordinance violated the First Amendment.

Does a Chicago city ordinance which bans non-union picketing within 150 feet of a school building violate both the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Whether respondents, in exercise of asserted First Amendment rights, may distribute handbills in a private shopping mall contrary to the owner's wishes and contrary to a policy enforced against all handbilling.

Whether arresting someone for wearing a jacket that says “Fuck the Draft” under a California statute which prohibits “offensive conduct” violated the First Amendment.

Whether a statute under which an individual can require a mailer to stop all future mailings that the person "believes to be erotically arousing or sexually provocative" violates the mailer's rights of free speech and due process.

Whether large shopping plazas are "public forums" where all citizens have a First Amendment right to petition and engage in peaceful expression. Picketing as protected free expression and the distinction between public forum v. property rights were also at issue.

Whether 1st and 14th Amendment freedoms give students the right to engage in peaceful protests on jailhouse grounds.

Whether a breach of the peace conviction arising out of a peaceful sit-in in a segregated library infringed upon the petitioners First Amendment free speech, assembly, and petition rights.

Do statutory "disturbance of the peace" and "obstruction of public passageways" convictions, for a peaceable demonstration that contains speech that may potentially incite violence, infringe on a demonstrator's First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and assembly?

Do statutory "disturbance of the peace" and "obstruction of public passageways" convictions, for a peaceable demonstration that contains speech that may potentially incite violence, infringe on a demonstrator's First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and assembly?

Whether the First Amendment was violated when civil rights protestors, marching in front of the state house, were arrested after refusing to disperse when a crowd gathered.

Whether a "Green River Ordiance" which bans the soliciting of individuals on their property without their consent violates the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment freedom of speech rights of magazine solicitors.

Whether a city ordinance which prescribes no appropriate standard for administrative action and gives an administrative official discretionary power to control in advance the right of citizens to speak on religious matters on the city streets is invalid under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

Whether a state, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, can impose criminal punishment on a person who undertakes to distribute religious literature on the premises of a company-owned town contrary to the wishes of the town's management.

Whether a local ordinance that prohibited any person from "distributing handbills, circulars or other advertisements to ring the door bell, sound the door knocker, or otherwise summon" a home dweller violated the First and Fourteenth Amendemnts.

Whether a state law prohibiting a parade or procession on a public street without a special license violates the First Amendment.

Whether a city ordinance mandating a permit to canvass or distribute circulars violated the First Amendment's freedom of speech

Whether a city ordinance that forbade public assembly in the streets or parks of the city without a permit is an unconstitutional violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments freedoms of speech and assembly.

Whether a city can prohibit an individual from preaching on a citys common without a permit from the mayor.